



The Immortal 600

An Immersion Event Hosted by the Western Independent Grays

March 2-4, 2007



157th New York

VOLUNTEER INFANTRY

The Madison and Cortland Regiment

Introduction

On August 20, 1864, a chosen group of 600 Confederate officer prisoners of war were transferred from their interment at Fort Delaware Prison, and to Federal-occupied Hilton Head, South Carolina. The purpose of this move was to place these men into a cramped stockade in front of Union artillery positions, to literally use these prisoners as human shields from the bombarding of the Confederate artillery of Charleston Harbor.

The 600 prisoners were landed on Morris Island, at the mouth of Charleston Harbor. There they remained, in an open 1 1/2 acre pen, under the shelling of friendly artillery fire. Three died on the starvation rations issued as a retaliation for the conditions of the Union prisoners held at Andersonville, Georgia and Salisbury, North Carolina.

On October 21, after 45 days under fire, the weakened survivors were removed to Fort Pulaski. Here they were crowded into the cold, damp casemates of the fort. On November 19, an attempt to relieve overcrowding was made by sending 197 of the men back to Hilton Head. For 42 days, a "retaliation ration" of 10 ounces of moldy cornmeal and soured onion pickles was the only food issued to the prisoners. Thirteen men died at Fort Pulaski, and five died at Hilton Head.

The remaining prisoners to survive, were returned to Fort Delaware on March 12, 1865, where an additional twenty-five died. The Immortal Six-Hundred became famous throughout the South for their adherence to principle, refusing to take the Oath of Allegiance under such adverse circumstances.

For More Information Please Read:

1. Immortal Captives: The Story of 600 Confederate Officers and the United States Prisoner of War Policy By Mauriel Phillips Joslyn.
2. The Biographical Roster of the Immortal 600 By Mauriel Phillips Joslyn.



REGIMENTAL DAYBOOK, 157th New York Volunteer Infantry

POST: Fort Pulaski, Cockspur Island, Georgia - Col. Philip Brown, 157th NYVI, cmd'g

SATURDAY, March 4, 1865

Officer-of-the-Day: 2Lt. R. S. Joslyn, Co. B

Officer-of-the-Guard: Capt. T. Jackson, Co. B

Sergeant-of-the-Guard: 1Sgt. T R. Lyons, Co. B

The continued absence of Cos. A, C, E and G, on detached service, has overburdened the available pool of men for the Guard Duty Roster. In spite of extra and double duties, the guard behaved with stoic determination.

- **10:00 AM.** Rebel officer Capt. Alex King was found dead in his bunk this morning. A burial detail of twelve rebels buried him in the rebel cemetery. The rebels conducted a short service.
- **10:30 AM.** Col. Brown conducted an inspection of the rebel prison. It was found filthy and unkempt. Their prolonged confinement is taking a toll. Sutler privileges were ordered curtailed.
- **11:00 AM.** Maj. Warnick, staff officer to Maj. Gen. Foster arrived at the Post on the morning packet from Hilton Head, accompanied by several day visitors. Maj. Warnick delivered an official correspondence to Col. Brown.
- **11:30 AM.** All officers and men were read General Order No.11, specifying in great detail that the rebel prisoners are on strict retaliatory status. No breached will be tolerated. Col. Brown then addressed the prisoners. Rations cut to 10 oz. of cornmeal per man per day. Surplus onion pickles may also be distributed.
- **12:15 PM.** Governor and Mrs. Stone have requested an interview with rebel officer, Capt. J. Hempstead of Virginia. Apparently Hempstead's father is an old friend of the Governor. Interview lasted about 30 minutes. Hempstead returned to prison.
- **1:45 PM.** Pvt. Kirkland reported sitting down while on guard duty. Sergeant-of-the-Guard removed Kirkland from the guard who was summarily punished by carrying a log in place of his musket for twenty-five penalty tours around the parade ground.
- **3:30 PM.** Mail call for prisoners. Letters and packages distributed. Col. under orders to disallow any further "Dixie" mails.
- **6:00 PM.** Evening Parade. All quiet.

SUNDAY, March 5, 1865

Officer-of-the-Day: 2Lt. R. S. Joslyn, Co. B

Officer-of-the-Guard: Capt. T. Jackson, Co. B

Sergeant-of-the-Guard: 1Sgt. R. Lyons, Co. B

Routine duties, following exceptions as noted. Gnats particularly annoying this morning.

- **1:00 AM.** I was awakened by the Hospital Steward, who reported two rebel officers missing from the Post Hospital. A general alarm was sounded and the regiment assembled on the parade ground. An immediate search of the Post made. A small boat chained to the North Channel dock was found missing; its chain being cut. A roll call of all the rebel officers was conducted. All accounted for except the two hospital inmates. The escapees are presumed to be making their way to upriver Savannah.
- **9:00 AM.** Sunday Morning Parade. Momentarily disrupted by a minor vocal disturbance from the prison. Casemate doors ordered closed for the day.
- **1:00 PM.** Mrs. Pace, a Post employee, was caught smuggling foodstuffs to the rebel officers. Col. B. has expelled her from the Fort, in violation of Gen. Order No. 11, leaving on the afternoon packet. Gov. Stone and entourage are also leaving on the afternoon packet.
- **4:00 PM.** Orders received to have rebel prisoners ready for immediate transfer to Hilton Head. U.S.S. Ida is enroute as their transport. All prisoners, many needing stretchers, were removed to the south channel dock, under guard of Cos. B & D. The entire garrison found this retaliation business most disagreeable. Reduced rations, fuel, and blankets have left many prisoners in a desperate state. I am thankful for their removal.
- **6:00 PM.** Evening Parade. All quiet.

157th New York - A Brief History of the Regiment

Source - <http://home.twcny.rr.com/g157/index.html>

The 157th Regiment of New York State Volunteers (N.Y.S.V.), also known as the "Madison and Cortland Regiment", was raised, as the name suggests, in Madison and Cortland Counties, in response to appeals from President Lincoln for volunteers. Bounties for enlistment were offered by villages, townships, and counties, as well as the state.

Five companies were raised from each of the two counties: Companies A, B, F, G, and I from **Madison County**, and Companies C, D, E, H, and K from Cortland County. The individual companies were recruited principally from the following locales: **A, at Hamilton, Madison, Sherburne, and Georgetown**; B, at Oneida; C, at Hamilton, Cincinnatus, Marathon, Cuyler, Taylor, Willet, Solon, Freetown, and Pitcher; D, at Scott, Preble, and Homer; E, at Cortland, Virgil, Harford, and Cortlandville; F, at Smyrna, Smithfield, Lebanon, Georgetown, Hamilton, Eaton, and Madison; G, at Canastota, Lenox, Clockville, Wampsville, Oneida, and Hamilton; H, at Homer, Truxton, and Cortlandville; I, at Sullivan, Smithfield, and Hamilton; and K, at Cortlandville, Marathon, Harford, Freetown, and Virgil.

The 157th N.Y.S.V. gathered at the fairgrounds in Hamilton, New York, in August of 1862, which camp was to become known as Camp Mitchell. On September 19th, 1862, the regiment was officially mustered into federal service for three years, or for the duration of the war (whichever came first), and on September 25th, the regiment left Camp Mitchell for Camp Chase in Arlington Heights, Virginia.

The Staff.

Philip P. Brown, Hamilton, Colonel.

George Arrowsmith, Hamilton, Lieutenant Colonel.

J. C. Carmichael, Cortland, Major.

P. H. McGraw, Cortland, Quartermaster.

H. C. Hendrick, Regimental Surgeon.

F. D. Beebe, Hamilton, Assistant Regimental Surgeon.

Reverend Barstow, Regimental Chaplain (promoted from the ranks).

Assignments. (Source: **National Park Service**. Please see **Note**, below.)

1st Brigade, 3rd Division, 11th Corps, Army of the Potomac, to July, 1863.

2nd Brigade, 1st Division, 11th Corps, to August, 1863.

2nd Brigade, Gordon's Division, 10th Corps, Folly Island, South Carolina, Department of the South, to February, 1864.

1st Brigade, Ames' Division, District of Florida, to April, 1864.

District of Florida, Department of the South, to June, 1864.

District of Hilton Head, South Carolina, Department of the South, to October, 1864.

3rd Separate Brigade, Department of the South, to November, 1864.

157th New York – Record of Service - (Source: **National Park Service**.)

- Duty in the defense of Washington, D.C., until November 1st, 1862.
- Movement to Centreville, Virginia, November 1st - 19th, 1862.
- Advance to Fredericksburg, Virginia, December 8th - 17th, 1862.
- At Stafford Court House until April 27th, 1863.
- "Mud March", January 20th - 24th, 1863.
- Chancellorsville campaign, April 27th - May 6th, 1863.
- Battle of Chancellorsville, May 1st - 5th, 1863.
- Gettysburg campaign, June 11th - July 24th, 1863.
- Battle of Gettysburg, July 1st - 3rd, 1863.
- Pursuit of Lee, July 5th - 24th, 1863.
- Movement to Morris Island, South Carolina, August 6th - 17th, 1863.

- Siege operations against Forts Wagner and Gregg, Morris Island, and against Fort Sumter and Charleston, August 17th - September 7th, 1863.
- Capture of Forts Wagner and Gregg, September 7th, 1863.
- Picket and outpost duty on Folly Island, South Carolina, and operating against Charleston until February, 1864.
- Expedition to John's and James Islands, February 6th - 14th, 1864.
- Ordered to Jacksonville, Florida, February 23rd. Duty there until June, 1864.
- Moved to Hilton Head, South Carolina. Expedition to Johns and James Islands, June 30th - July 10th, 1864.
- Operations against Battery Pringle, July 4th - 9th, 1864.
- Boudren's Causeway, July 9th. Duty at Morris Island until October, 1864.
- Moved to Fort Pulaski, Georgia, October, 1864. Garrison duty there until February, 1865.

157th New York - **Battle Honors** (Source: Isabel Bracy. Please see Note, below.)


- **Chancellorsville, Virginia, May 1st - 3rd, 1863 - Lost 98 casualties.**
- **Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, July 1st - 3rd, 1863 - Lost 307 casualties.**
- Boonesboro, Maryland, July 8th, 1863.
- Hagerstown, Maryland, July 12th - 13th, 1863.
- Siege of Battery Wagner, South Carolina, August 20th - September 7th, 1863.
- Bombardment of Fort Sumter, South Carolina, August 20th - 23rd, 1863.
- Operations in Charleston Harbor, September 8th - December 31st, 1863.
- Bombardment of Fort Sumter, South Carolina, October 27th - November 9th, 1863.
- Seabrook and John's Islands, South Carolina, February 9th - 11th, 1864.
- Camp Finnegan, Florida, June 2nd, 1864.
- Johns Island, South Carolina, July 4th - 7th, 1864.

Casualties


PLACE.	Date.	Killed.		Wounded.				Missing.		Aggregate.
		Officers.	Enlisted men.	Died.		Recov'd.		Officers.	Enlisted men.	
				Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.			
1863.										
Chancellorsville, Va.	May 1-3	1	12		12	3	51	1	18	98
Gettysburg, Pa.	July 1-3	4	25	2	21	6	137	6	106	307
Boonsboro, Md.	8									
Hagerstown, Md.	12-13									
Siege of Battery Wagner, S. C.	Aug. 20- Sept. 7		1							1
Bombardment of Fort Sumter.	Aug. 20-23									
Operations in Charleston Harbor, S. C.	Sept. 8- Dec. 31									
Bombardment of Fort Sumter.	Oct. 27- Nov. 9									
1864.										
Sea Brook and John's Islands, S. C.	Feb. 9-11		1				7			8
Camp Finnegan, Fla.	June 2						2			2
John's Island, S. C.	July 4-9					1	1		1	3
Honey Hill, S. C.	Nov. 30		2		3	4	23			32
Boyd's Point, S. C.	Dec. 3						1			1
Coosawhatchie, S. C.	5				1		7			8
Deveaux Neck, S. C.	6-7		1		2		21			24
Tillifenny Station, S. C.	9		2		1	2	14		1	20
1865.										
Manningsville, S. C.	April 8									
Dingle's Mills, S. C.	9		5				23			28
Near Singleton's Plantation, S. C.	12		1							1
Big Rafting Creek, S. C.	19									
Statesburg, S. C.	19									
Total loss.		5	50	2	40	16	287	7	126	533

157th N.Y.S.V. Battlefield Maps - Gettysburg


(Red arrows indicate the positions of the 157th N.Y.S.V.)



Positions on July 1st before the battle, north of town.



(1) The 11th Corps line on July 1st; (2) The rebels attack, driving the Union forces back; (3) Gettysburg today.



(1) The 11th Corps line on July 3rd, south of town

"The Unlucky 11th"

"THE 11th ARMY CORPS ON JULY 1, 1863"

By D. Scott Hartwig

ABOUT THE AUTHOR - D. Scott Hartwig is a 1978 graduate of the University of Wyoming, Hartwig studied Civil War history under E. B. Long. He has been an interpretive Park Ranger at Gettysburg National Military Park since 1980. He is presently working on a study of the Maryland Campaign of 1862.

(On the numbered sources, press "control" and left-click to view on-line source if viewing on a monitor.)

It was shortly after 10:30 a.m. when Maj. Gen. Carl Schurz's 3rd Division of the 11th Corps, passed Horner's Mill on the Taneytown Road. The division, along with the balance of the corps, was en route for Gettysburg from its June 30 bivouac at Emmitsburg, Maryland. To facilitate the movement of the corps, its commander, Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard sent his 3rd and 2nd Divisions, respectively, by way of the Taneytown Road, and directed the 1st. Division to follow the 1st Corps up the Emmitsburg Road.¹ The weather was cloudy and humid with occasional rain showers drenching the moving column of men and turning the dirt roads into slippery mud. The first several miles of the march were unremarkable-the sultry atmosphere preventing the sound of battle at Gettysburg from reaching the column-and the tedium was only broken momentarily when the head of the column crossed the Pennsylvania border. The Pennsylvania regiments of Schurz's Division beat their drums, dipped their colors, and raised a cheer for their native soil. Then the march resumed its steady, monotonous pace along the muddy road.²

As Schurz's column cleared Horner's Mill, approximately 5-6 miles southeast of Gettysburg, he was met by a hard riding courier from corps commander Howard. The courier brought news that the 1st Corps was engaged at Gettysburg and that

Schurz was to assume command of the corps and bring up his command with all haste. Schutz summoned 1st Brigade commander, Brig. Gen. Alexander Schimmelfennig, and turned command of the division over to the former Prussian Army officer with instructions to increase the pace to the "double-quick." Schutz spurred on to Gettysburg with his staff.

As the cavalcade neared Gettysburg they encountered an increasing stream of civilian fugitives fleeing from Gettysburg. One terrified woman attempted to stop Schurz, crying out, "Hard times at Gettysburg! They are shooting and killing! What will become of us!" For all Schurz knew there was no fighting at Gettysburg, for he had heard no sounds of battle even though he was now only several miles from town.3

With his glasses and tousled hair and beard, 33-year-old Carl Schutz, looked more the part of a college professor than warrior. Indeed, he possessed a brilliant mind and was adept with the use of the pen. He had been born in Prussia and, in 1848, served as a subaltern against the Prussian Army in the European Revolutions. The Prussians crushed the insurgents and Schutz fled to Switzerland. By 1856 he found his way to the United States by way of Great Britain and France. He settled in Wisconsin and promptly became an outspoken advocate of abolition. He was a gifted orator and he campaigned vigorously for Abraham Lincoln in the 1860 election. In the Spring of 1862, Schutz received a brigadier general's commission in the volunteers despite his extremely limited military background. To his credit, Schutz applied himself to the study of military science and he developed into a competent soldier, fighting with some ability at 2nd Manassas and again at Chancellorsville, where his division was routed through no fault of his own. Nevertheless, Schurz's reputation had suffered from Chancellorsville and his association with the 11th Corps, which was alone held responsible for the Union defeat in that battle.

Schurz galloped up to Cemetery Hill around 11:30 a.m. and reported to Howard. The soft-spoken Howard gave Schutz the grim news of Reynolds' death and informed the Prussian of what little he knew of the general situation. While the two men discussed the state of affairs a report from Brig. Gen. James Wadsworth, commanding the 1st Division of the 1st Corps, was received. Wadsworth offered the opinion that the enemy forces in front were relatively weak but that the enemy seemed to be moving around his right flank. From Cemetery Hill, Howard could see nothing of the enemy and very little of the 1st Corps. If Wadsworth was correct then the Confederates might be moving to seize a commanding hill (Oak Hill) situated off of Wadsworth's right flank. If the 1st Corps position west of Gettysburg was to be secured it would be necessary to seize this hill before Southern forces did. Accordingly, he instructed Schurz to take the 1st and 3rd Divisions, approximately 5,386 men, not counting stragglers, through Gettysburg and occupy Oak Ridge and Oak Hill, thereby extending and securing the right flank of the 1ST Corps. The 2nd Division, under Brig. Gen. Adolph von Steinwehr, 2,861 electives bolstered by Capt. Lewis Heckman's K, 1ST Ohio Light (4 Napoleons) and Captain Michael Weidrich's 1, 1ST New York Light (6 3-inch rifles), were to halt on Cemetery Hill where they would constitute the general reserve. No provisions were made to defend the northern approach to Gettysburg because no Confederate force was yet reported approaching from that direction. If a Confederate force did move upon Gettysburg from the north or northeast Howard could rely that Col. Thomas Devin's Brigade of John Buford's Cavalry Division, which was picketing the northern approaches, would provide timely warning.4

Between 12:30 and 12:45 p.m. the head of the 3rd Division came hustling up to Cemetery Hill. Although the division had farther to march than Brig. Gen. Francis Barlow's 1ST Division, Barlow had been slowed by the trains of the 1st Corps and was still a good one-half hour distant. Schimmelfennig's men were "panting and out of breath" and streaming with perspiration as they swept past Cemetery Hill. The rapid marching had caused large intervals between regiments so that the division arrived in pieces rather than in a body. 5

The imminent action the corps seemed sure to engage in offered an opportunity for it to redeem its badly tarnished reputation. Throughout the rest of the army the 11th Corps was seen as the weak link and such slurs as "Howard's cowards" and "The flying Dutchmen" were hurled at them. The intense feeling against the corps had developed from two separate causes. One was nationality. A large percentage of the corps was composed of Germans, many of whom spoke little English. Many officers, likewise, like Schurz and Schimmelfennig, were foreign born. Despite the long military tradition of the German states, the Germans were held in contempt by the English speaking element of the army and considered to be poor fighters.

The performance of the corps at Chancellorsville bore out the myth that the Germans of the corps were cowardly soldiers. The corps was placed upon the extreme right flank of the army. When Lt. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson made his march to gain the Union flank, corps commander Howard ignored numerous warnings that he was about to be attacked upon his flank

and so failed to take precautionary measures that might have prevented disaster. Jackson attacked and routed the corps. Placed as they were, Howard's men, or any other men in the same situation, never had a chance. The rest of the army was unforgiving however, and found the Germans of the 11th Corps a convenient scapegoat for the Union defeat.

Morale in the corps plummeted and discipline grew slack. "I confess that I have but little confidence in the Corps," wrote Capt. Fred Winkler of the 26th Wisconsin: "jealousy and intrigue between officers has, in many of our old regiments, destroyed all discipline; most of them have a very good reputation for fighting and they may fight well under favorable circumstances, but they are not reliable in any emergency." Winkler struck upon the problem with the 11th Corps and it had nothing to do with nationality. The key word was discipline. Soldiers without strong discipline will not fight well no matter what nationality they hail from.6

Affairs were particularly bad in the corps 1st Division, which had suffered the initial shock of Jackson's attack at Chancellorsville. To bring the division back to its feet Howard brought 28-year-old Brig. Gen. Francis Barlow to its command. A boyish-faced prewar lawyer, Barlow had proven himself a hard, aggressive fighter and stern disciplinarian. To assist Barlow, Howard secured another tough disciplinarian, a 27-year-old West Pointer, Brig. Gen. Adelbert Ames, to command the division's 2nd Brigade. Barlow found the position a difficult one and he complained later of his German regiments, "But these Dutch won't fight. Their officers say so & they say so themselves & they ruin all with whom they come in contact." Following Gettysburg he would write, "I would take a brigade to such a division."7

Yet another indication that the corps lacked any esprit was the fact that few men wore the corps badge of the half moon although in other corps it was almost universally worn. Part of the lack of esprit stemmed from a lack of confidence in corps commander Oliver O. Howard. It had been Howard's misfortune to replace Franz Sigel, a miserable soldier, but exceptionally popular with the corps' German regiments. Howard's aloof personality won him few friends and he put no fire into the downcast spirits of his men. His handling of the corps at Chancellorsville only reinforced the corps' displeasure with their commander, as Captain Winkler explained to his girl in a letter of May 12, ". . . very little confidence is felt in General Howard. Troops without confidence in their leaders are worth nothing."8

So the corps marched to battle at Gettysburg under an ugly cloud of shaky morale and uncertain leadership. It was not a promising state of affairs.

The leading regiment of the corps was Col. George von Amsburg's 45th New York Infantry of the 1st Brigade, 3rd Division. The 45th counted 375 officers and men, Germans nearly to a man. The hard marching Germans streamed past Cemetery Hill and passed north on Washington Street emerging on the northern edge of town.9

Some minutes after the 45th disappeared into town, Capt. Hubert Dilger's Company 1, 1st Ohio Light (6 Napoleons), one of the best batteries in the army, came rumbling up the road with the rest of the 1st Brigade struggling behind. Some distance behind came Col. Wladimir Krzyzanowski's 2nd Brigade."10

When acting 3rd Division commander Schimmelfennig rode up, Schurz instructed him to take the division through town and deploy on the right of the 1st Corps. Schimmelfennig moved on with his men and Schurz remained near the intersection of the Taneytown Road and Emmitsburg Road to await the arrival of Barlow's Division. 11

The trains of the 1st Corps had slowed Barlow's pace so that the head of his division did not make its appearance until after 1 p.m. Schurz summoned the New Yorker and the latter rode ahead and met his corps commander at the above road intersection. Schurz instructed Barlow to take his division through town and deploy one brigade on the right of the 3rd Division, which should be west of the Mummasburg Road, and place the other brigade east of the road, en echelon to the main line of the corps. While Barlow waited for his division to come up, Schurz rode to inspect the deployment of the 3rd Division. 12

Schurz's intended deployment of the 3rd Division had hit a snag. The obstacle was the nearly 8,000-man division of Maj. Gen. Robert E. Rodes which had beaten the 11th Corps in the foot race to occupy Oak Hill. Rodes was on the hill in force and only a fight would secure it for the Federals.

As the 45th New York emerged from town on the Mummasburg Road, Colonel von Amsburg ordered the four right companies under Capt. Francis Irsch to deploy as skirmishers "to the right of the Mummasburg Road as far as he could

towards the east." Von Amsburg promised to follow with the balance of the regiment as soon as the men had closed up and caught their breath." 13

Irsch spread his four companies out, facing Oak Hill, and stepped off. A battery, stationed near Wilbur McLean's farm situated at the base of the hill, proceeded to lob shells at Irsch's deploying line, but with little effect initially. The battery was Capt. R. C. M. Page's Virginia Battery (4 Napoleons), belonging to the artillery battalion of Rodes' Division. Page's battery had been dispatched by Rodes to dispute the advance of the 11th Corps, which he presumed intended to attack his left flank. Rodes also deployed the crack Georgia Brigade of Brig. Gen. George Doles between the Carlisle Road and northern extension of Oak Ridge. It was Doles's duty to hold the 11th Corps at bay, preventing them from turning Rodes's flank, until Maj. Gen. Jubal Early's Division, which was approaching from Heidlersburg along the Harrisburg Road, could arrive. To assist Doles in this difficult mission a battalion of Alabama sharpshooters under Maj. Eugene Blackford were deployed in a long line extending from Oak Ridge (the northern extension) to the Harrisburg Road, near Blocher's Knoll (known today as Barlow's Knoll). It was Blackford's keen eyed riflemen that brought the first accurate fire upon Irsch's New Yorkers.14

"Under a terrific artillery and sharpshooter fire," Irsch worked his skirmish line forward. Losses began to mount as Blackford's crack shots found their targets and Page's gunners found the range. Despite the intense fire Irsch pushed on for perhaps 400 yards when he ordered his men to lie down behind nearby fences. With the advantage of some cover the New Yorkers opened a rapid and deadly fire with their Remington rifles.15

As Irsch's men worked their Remington rifles with good effect, Lt. Col. Adolphus Dobke came up in the rear with the remaining six companies of the regiment, lending some bark behind the bite of the skirmish line. Soon, Dilger's battery of Napoleons came jingling out of town on the Mummasburg Road. Schimmelfennig directed the Ohioan to take position between the Mummasburg and Carlisle Roads and engage Rodes's batteries thereby drawing their fire from the deploying infantry of the 3rd Division. Dilger responded by advancing Lt. Clark Scripture's section forward, presumably to a point near, but east of, Doersom's farm. Scripture's Napoleons quickly drew the fire of Page's four Napoleons and Dilger was compelled to reinforce him with the entire battery.16

While Dilger's guns duelled with Page and Irsch kept Blackford's Alabamians at arm's length, Schimmelfennig's 3rd Division came streaming onto the field. On the heels of Dilger came Colonel Stephen McGroarty's 61st Ohio, a slim 143 electives. McGroarty was instructed to deploy his regiment as skirmishers and extend the right of the 45th New York towards the Carlisle Road. Following the Ohioans came the balance of the 1st Brigade, now under Col. George von Amsburg of the 45th New York. Col. Adolph von Hartung's under strength 74th Pennsylvania, 134 strong, was deployed as skirmishers and went into position on the right of the 61st Ohio, along a dirt lane that ran from the Carlisle Road towards Wilbur McLean's farm in the shadow of Oak Ridge. As the senior officer Hartung assumed command of the skirmish line which now numbered nearly 425 men and extended from the Mummasburg Road to the Carlisle Road. On the left of the line, Irsch's New Yorkers dislodged Blackford's troublesome sharpshooters from Hagy's orchard giving the left end of the skirmish line a firm anchor and denying the Confederates a fine concealed position from which to pop away at the Federals. On the 61st Ohio and 74th Pennsylvania's front the skirmishing was sharp. Hartung was wounded and command fell to Lt. Col. Alexander von Mitzel. These regiments killed and wounded totaled 96 men, most of them no doubt shot on the skirmish line.17

The balance of the 1st Brigade, the 157th New York and 82nd Illinois, 725 men, under von Amsberg's personal direction, deployed in the rear of Dilger's guns and were instructed to lie down.18

The duel between Dilger's and Page's batteries had intensified during the 1st Brigade's arrival as Rodes reinforced Page with Capt. W. J. Reese's 4 3-inch rifles of the Jeff Davis (Alabama) Artillery. Dilger's magnificent gunnery soon gained the upper hand. He dealt Page a thorough pounding, killing or mortally wounding 4 men, wounded 26 and killed 17 horses. Page pulled his wrecked battery under cover and Reese, lest he draw Dilger's deadly fire, also fell silent.19

During Dilger's gun duel, Krzyzanowski's 2nd Brigade, counting approximately 1,270 officers and men, came double-quicking down Washington Street. Schimmelfennig ordered the Pole to mass his men in support of Dilger. Forming in double column of companies, the regiments took position in an orchard northeast of Pennsylvania College. From left to right the order of battle was the 82nd Ohio, 75th Pennsylvania, light New York, and 26th Wisconsin. Two companies of the 58th New York were also present and they were likely attached to one of the above regiments. As the regiments filed

into position Krzyzanowski directed Col. John T. Lockman of the 119th New York to deploy two companies of skirmishers and have them occupy a farm (possibly the Almshouse area) and outbuildings beyond the right flank of the division.

Despite Dilger's counter-battery fire, Krzyzanowski's Brigade drew fire from Reese and Page before they were silenced. The dense mass of bluecoats made a splendid target as Captain Alfred Lee of E Company, 82nd Ohio, recalled:

The return fire of the rebel guns was lively, and their shot and shell ricocheted splendidly over the open fields. While the regiment was taking its position, a corporal of my company (23-year-old Cpl. Isaiah Mahan) was struck by one of these misses and thrown prostrate. Directly another soldier was struck, and the regiment, being unable to return fire, slightly shifted its position. Then the rolls were called, and the men quietly responded to their names amid the boom of cannon and the screech of exploding shells.20

To the 82nd's right, Col. Francis Mahler's 75th Pennsylvania lost 1 killed and 2 wounded to the Southern artillery. Slight casualties one might be prompted to say, but the effect of artillery is also psychological. Its purpose is to inflict damage but also to break down the will to combat in the enemy. Considering the Confederate artillery fire emanated from the vicinity of Oak Ridge, which dominated the 11th Corps position, its effect must have been demoralizing and unnerving.21

Up on the skirmish line the action was intensifying. Around 1:30 p.m. Rodes's assault upon Robinson's Division of the 1st Corps on Oak Ridge jumped off. Irsch's New Yorkers soon observed the dark lines of Col. Edward A. O'Neal's Alabama Brigade emerge from the woods on Oak Hill and advance along the slope and base of the hill towards Robinson's right flank. Irsch's men peppered the 26th Alabama on O'Neal's left with a flank fire but failed to check it. Irsch sought stronger measures. A request was dispatched to Dilger to engage O'Neal with canister and shrapnel. Dilger gave them shrapnel, concentrating the fire of all six guns upon O'Neal's infantry while the 45th New York skirmishers kept up a steady fire as the Southern infantry passed across their front. Colonel Dobke alertly began to shift the remaining six companies of the 45th towards the gap between the 1st and 11th Corps. Dobke's concentrated fire, combined with Irsch's, Dilger's, and two regiments of Robinson's Division was more than O'Neal's three regiments could stand. "The enemy began to break and run," recalled a member of the 45th, and Irsch roused his skirmishers to their feet and sent them in a rush for Wilbur McLean's farm, where many Alabamians had sought shelter from the fire. The tough Germans scrambled through McLean's outbuildings and barn and emerged with a sizeable number of butternut prisoners who they ordered to the rear.22

The arrival and deployment of the 3rd Division had scarcely been completed when Schurz, who by this time had arrived at the front, received a report from Howard that a large enemy force was reported to be approaching from the direction of Heidlersburg. Howard directed Schurz to halt his command in place and prevent his right flank from being turned, but to also push forward a "thick line of skirmishers" and attempt to still seize Oak Hill. No doubt because of these orders, Schurz kept the entire 3rd Division east of the Mummasburg Road, rather than deploying it on the west side as he had intended to do. As Schurz digested and pondered Howard's new orders and the ominous news they carried, O'Neal's attack jumped off on Oak Ridge. The escalating musketry fire caught Schurz's curiosity and he rode forward to the Hagy farm. Dismounting, he climbed to the roof of Hagy's house to get a better view of the situation. 23

While Schurz was absent from his headquarters to study the situation at the front, Barlow's 1st Division, accompanied by Howard, came slogging up Washington Street through mud "four inches deep." The men were greatly exhausted having double-quickened several miles. To their delight and refreshment, many women of Gettysburg emerged from their homes along Washington Street and "stood along the sidewalks with buckets of water, and doing all they could for men."24

Howard probably accompanied Barlow to the northern edge of town. Here he left the New Yorker and apparently made a brief examination of the dispositions of the 3rd Division. He did not meet with Schurz, who was up at Hagy's farm, but rode on to Robinson's Division and on down Seminary Ridge to Maj. Gen. Abner Doubleday's Corps headquarters. It was unfortunate that Howard did not make an effort to speak personally with Schurz. Being unfamiliar with the ground Schurz would have to defend and the amount of resistance he was encountering, Howard could form no opinion whether the force he had given Schurz was adequate. In fact, Schurz, from his observations on the roof of Hagy's house, had decided his force was not adequate and sent a request to Cemetery Hill for one of the reserve brigades to be placed in support of his right flank. Affairs had changed dramatically since Howard and Schurz had spoken at 12:30 p.m. The basic mission of the 11th Corps had been changed by Howard from an offensive to a defensive role. The enemy had also been substantially

reinforced as indicated by their presence on Oak Hill, and Howard knew that yet another enemy force was approaching from Heidlersburg. A reappraisal of the deployment of the 11th Corps was in order. To obey Howard's orders Schurz would have to stretch his two divisions perilously thin on poor defensive ground. Schurz needed to either be withdrawn, in which case Doubleday would have to be withdrawn, or reinforced. For the moment, Howard did neither, choosing to husband his reserves until the enemy had displayed his force.25

If Howard seemed removed from the changing nature of the situation at the front, Schurz, in contrast, was keeping his fingers on the pulse of the battle from his rooftop perch on Mr. Hagy's farmhouse. He observed the repulse of O'Neal, which was encouraging, but observed Doles maneuvering his brigade beyond Schimmelfennig's center and right. He was particularly anxious about his right flank after Howard's warning of a reported enemy build-up between the York and Harrisburg Roads. The corps was aligned to confront Rodes on Oak Hill. If an enemy force came down the Harrisburg Road they could fall upon his exposed right. Schurz wanted some insurance against such a scenario and he sent an aide galloping to Howard with a request for a brigade of the 2nd Division to be placed en echelon to Barlow, near the railroad depot. "My intention was to have that brigade in readiness to charge upon any force the enemy might move around my right," reported Schurz.26

Having completed his observations on the left, Schurz rode back to his command post on the Mummasburg Road. He was greeted with a jolt when he discovered that Barlow had pushed on with his division and lost connection with the 3rd Division. Schurz quickly sent orders to have the right wing of the 3rd Division advanced to re-establish a connection with the 1st Division and dispatched "aide after aide" to Howard repeating his request for a brigade from the 2nd Division. Meanwhile, the enemy opened again with their artillery from Oak Ridge. This fire was seconded by several batteries which suddenly opened an enfilading fire from the Harrisburg Road, in the direction from which Schurz most feared an attack.27

When Barlow arrived on the northern edge of town he found the 3rd Division massed in his front but apparently in the act of deploying. Actually, the 3rd Division was responding to the renewal of the Confederate artillery fire from Oak Ridge. Rodes had reinforced his battered batteries with Capt. W. P. Carter's battery of rifles and they opened from positions around the base of the ridge. To reply to Carter's 10-pound Parrotts, Hubert Dilger requested a battery of rifles and Lt. William Wheeler's 13th New York Battery (4 3-inch rifles) was sent forward. Wheeler came into action on Dilger's left and opened up on Carter. Under Wheeler's covering fire Dilger limbered and advanced his Napoleons under a "very heavy fire" several hundred yards forward. When Dilger unlimbered and began thundering away, Wheeler limbered and followed going into position on the Ohioans' right. To support the artillery's advanced position, Schimmelfennig pushed the 82nd Illinois and 157th New York forward as battery supports. 28

Barlow moved across the rear of Krzyzanowski's massed brigade, crossed the Carlisle Road and passed between Crawford's farm and the edge of town. At Crawford's farm they turned up the Harrisburg Road. Rodes's artillery shifted the attention of some of their guns to the big targets the 1st Division presented. "The shells were coming pretty thick before we reached the barn (Almshouse)," wrote Reuben Ruch of the 153rd Pennsylvania. One shell exploded over the 153rd causing the entire regiment to dodge but inflicting no casualties. 29

The column followed the Harrisburg Road until reached the Almshouse complex where Barlow called a halt and had his regiments mass. During this brief halt, Barlow probably studied the terrain to determine how to deploy his division. He likely presumed that the 3rd Division would extend its right across the Carlisle Road when it completed its own deployment. Barlow's eye saw little ground that could be considered good defensive ground. Only a knoll, known as Blocher's Knoll, rising up to feet, that stood perhaps 400 yards north of the Almshouse and overlooked Rock Creek, offered any promise. The summit of the knoll was clear; making it a fine platform for artillery, but part of the northern slope was covered by woods that extended down to the creek. While not a dominating position, it did command the slight ridge the Alms house was situated upon. In the hands of the Confederates combined with the strong position they already possessed upon Oak Hill, the position of the 11th Corps north of Gettysburg could be made untenable. Indeed, Confederate skirmishers were already on the knoll, concealed in Blocher's Woods. Barlow determined to occupy the knoll even though he was no doubt aware that such a move would push the right of the corps farther forward than Schurz probably desired. Col. Leopold von Gilsa, commanding the 1st Brigade, was ordered to advance and seize the knoll.30

Von Gilsa counted three regiments in his brigade; the 54th and 68th New York and a nine-month regiment, the 153rd Pennsylvania, which was due to muster out soon. The 41st New York was absent on detached duty guarding corps trains

at Emmitsburg. The brigade had been severely handled at Chancellorsville and could muster only 936 officers and men on July 1. 31 After piling their knapsacks, von Gilsa's regiments deployed for the advance. The woods on Blocher's Knoll and a wheatfield west of the knoll were crawling with Blackford's sharpshooters and skirmishers of Doles's Brigade. To offer less of a target to the Southern riflemen, von Gilsa opted to deploy both the 54th and 68th New York and two companies of the 153rd Pennsylvania as skirmishers. The remaining eight companies of the 153rd would follow formed by battalion en masse. 32

As the regiments deployed into skirmish formation von Gilsa noticed the color company of the 153rd deploying to the skirmish line. The gruff German rode over to regimental commander Maj. John F. Frueauff and asked "what in hell that color division was deploying for." When the regiment had halted at the Almshouse and massed in doubled column of companies, the skirmish companies-A and F-had found themselves at the rear of the regiment, while the color company had found itself in the front division. When von Gilsa had ordered skirmishers deployed Frueauff had simply ordered the first division forward as skirmishers. The color division, being in front, assumed this meant them and they stepped off bringing the wrath of von Gilsa upon their commander. But Frueauff was spared further abuse at the hands of his brigade commander when 2nd Lt. J. Clyde Miller of A Company, who had observed the incident, alertly ordered A and F, companies to clear the regiment's flanks and double-quick to the front assuming their proper place on the skirmish line. Miller executed the movement with consummate skill eliciting words of praise from 1st Lt. Benjamin Schaum of Miller's Company. Schaum's words of praise had scarcely left his mouth when he dropped, shot through the knee cap by one of Doles's or Blackford's skirmishers.33

Schaum was not the regiment's first casualty to Southern musketry. Moments before Schaum was felled, 21-year-old 1st Lt. William H. Beaver was shot through the heart as he ordered his men to advance. Shell fire from Rodes's line also searched the Federal line. One shell whipped past Miller's face, so close he thought he felt the swing of its fuse strike his face. No doubt shaken by his brush with death, Miller nevertheless pressed on with his advancing skirmish line.34

Von Gilsa posted himself in rear of his skirmish line as it advanced in the face of a sharp Confederate skirmish fire. Reuben Ruch, a private in F Company, 153rd Pennsylvania, marching with the main body of the regiment, could hear his brigade commander tell his skirmishers as he rode back and forth not to "shoot unless they saw something to shoot at, as ammunition was worth money, and they must not waste it."35

Blackford's and Doles's skirmishers slowly retired from tree-to-tree in Blocher's Woods before the approach of the cloud of blue-coated skirmishers. Skirmishers of the 68th New York soon cleared the wheatfield while the rest of the skirmish line took possession of the woods and knoll. With the knoll in his possession, von Gilsa promptly disposed his brigade to defend it. The skirmish line of the 153rd Pennsylvania remained within Blocher's Woods while the contingent from the 68th New York extended the line to the left, towards the Carlisle Road. Along the banks of Rock Creek and east of the woods, he placed the remaining men of the 68th New York and on their right, extending to the bridge over Rock Creek, the 54th New York, 189 men, went into position. Considering the ground these two regiments had to cover and their slim numbers they must have remained in skirmish formation for they could not have filled the space in line of battle. In rear of the 54th and 68th, von Gilsa placed the eight remaining companies of the 153rd Pennsylvania. The left of this regiment lay within Blocher's Woods and the right was extended across the northeastern slope of the knoll. To cover the ground the regiment deployed in a thin, single line. Exhausted by the rigors of the day, the Pennsylvanians threw themselves upon the grassy slope to snatch some rest. In front, on the skirmish line, the firing continued unabated.36

Von Gilsa's position was anything but secure. His left was largely unsupported and Ames's Brigade was several hundred yards to his right rear providing distant support. Barlow had massed his 2nd Brigade east of the Harrisburg Road, behind the ridge the Almshouse was situated upon. The regiments had massed in double column of companies with the 107th Ohio, 25th Ohio, and 17th Connecticut in line from right to left and the 75th Ohio in support. Lt. Bayard Wilkeson's Company G, 4th U.S. Artillery (6 Napoleons) took position in their front along the ridge. To cover his front, Ames ordered Lt. Col. Douglas Fowler to dispatch four companies of his regiment, the 17th Connecticut, as skirmishers. Fowler called for volunteers and Companies A, B, F, and K responded and moved out under the command of Maj. Allen G. Brady. Brady deployed two companies in skirmish formation to the right of the Rock Creek Bridge and kept the other two in line as a reserve. His objective was the farm of Josiah Benner, situated just north of the bridge, which would serve as an excellent strongpoint from which to harass the Confederates.37

Brady's two companies of skirmishers advanced loading and firing their Enfield rifle-muskets with rapidity, followed by the two reserve companies in line. Brady had his companies execute a left wheel as they crossed Rock Creek so his right would swing around and envelop Benner's house. The New Englanders had nearly reached Benner's farmyard when Confederate artillery, situated upon a ridge running east of the Harrisburg Road and several hundred yards north of Benner's, opened without warning with "shot, shell, grape and canister." This storm of fire checked the 17th, but Brady, a leader of men, dismounted and walked in front of his prone skirmishers and led them forward. As they neared Benner's house several Southern shells struck it setting it afire and denying its cover to Brady's men. Undaunted Brady simply disposed his men about the other cover Benner's farm offered and kept up a steady musketry fire.38

The guns that had surprised Brady belonged to the artillery battalion of Maj. Gen. Jubal Early's 5,460-man division which had arrived upon the battlefield from Heidfersburg. Early had come up around 2 p.m. By this time von Gilsa was visible and probably elements of Schimmelfennig's Division. These troops seemed to be pressing Doles's outnumbered brigade and threatening to turn Rodes's left. To offer some relief to Doles, Early summoned his artillery battalion, under the command of Lt. Col. Hilary Jones. Jones counted four batteries containing 8 Napoleons, 6 3-inch rifles, and 2 10-pound Parrotts. He unlimbered 12 guns on a ridge running east of the Harrisburg Road where he could bring von Gilsa under fire and enfilade Dilger's and Wheeler's batteries, who were busy with Rodes's artillery. The gun teams quickly cleared for action and shells soon were reaching out for the Federal lines.39

While Jones placed his guns, Early also brought his infantry up. The leading brigade under the fiery Brig. Gen. John B. Gordon deployed in the fields west of the Harrisburg Road. Gordon dropped the 26th Georgia off in support of Jones's guns which left him with 1,498 men in line. On his left, Brig. Gen. Harry Hays's Louisiana Brigade, 1,295 electives, came into line. Hays placed the 5th, 6th, and right wing of the 9th Louisiana west of the Harrisburg Road on Gordon's left, and the left wing of the 8th, the 7th and 8th east of the road. Col. Isaac E. Avery's North Carolina Brigade of 1,244 men moved across Hays's rear and deployed on his left. Brig. Gen. William Smith's small Virginia brigade of 806 effectives formed in rear of Avery fronting southeastward toward the York Pike, no doubt to keep an eye on elements of Devin's cavalry which was operating in that direction.40

Early's ominous buildup on the right of the 11th Corps did not go unnoticed by Barlow. To answer Jones's artillery he dispatched 19-year-old Lieutenant Wilkeson with two sections of his battery to Blocher's Knoll. Lt. Col. Jeremiah William's 25th Ohio, 220 strong, was detached to follow Wilkeson and support his guns.41

Wilkeson unlimbered his Napoleons on the summit of Blocher's Knoll above the prone 153rd Pennsylvania and opened upon Jones's line of guns. The regulars quickly drew the fire of two of Jones's batteries thus relieving von Gilsa's infantry of some shelling, but bringing severe punishment upon themselves. Early in the duel Wilkeson went down in a heap with a terrible wound, one of his legs being smashed by a shell so that it was held together by mere pieces of flesh. In Wilkeson's stead, Lt. Eugene Bancroft assumed command and kept the men at their work despite the furious fire concentrated upon them. In the ensuing duel Bancroft lost 1 gun disabled, 12 horses killed, 4 men wounded, and Pvt. Charles F. Hofer killed.42

Observing the pressure upon Bancroft, but also appreciating the value of Blocher's Knoll as an artillery position, Barlow dispatched a request for additional artillery support. A battery was promised but Barlow would not be on Blocher's Knoll by the time it approached the front. 43

Before he had been felled, Wilkeson had called up his reserve section under Lt. Christopher F. Merkle. This section unlimbered some distance to the left of Wilkeson's position where it could provide support to the division's left flank. Merkle engaged a Confederate battery initially (probably one of Rodes's), but then observed a heavy body of Confederate infantry approaching the 1st Division's left and shifted his fire upon it. It was Doles's Brigade.44

The appearance of Doles's Brigade and threatening posture of Early's deployment prompted Barlow to draw Ames's entire brigade from its en echelon position to bolster the defense of Blocher's Knoll. Barlow considered the knoll an "admirable position" and he intended to fight his battle there. The 25th Ohio was moved up from its position in support of Bancroft's guns and ordered forward into Blocher's Woods on the left of von Gilsa. The regiment halted overlooking Rock Creek and covered its front with Companies A and F deployed as skirmishers. Col. Seraphim Meyer led the 107th Ohio, Ames's strongest regiment, the 107th Ohio, 458 electives, into line on the 25th's left, Meyer apparently deployed facing northwest,

at an angle to the 25th, in order to face Doles's Brigade. The 75th Ohio and six companies of the 17th Connecticut were halted and massed under the crest of Blocher's Knoll, where they constituted the division reserve.45

Barlow now had his entire division, approximately 2,059 men, minus the 4 companies of the 17th Connecticut, on or near Blocher's Knoll. If he had looked to his left rear he would have seen the dense blue masses of Krzyzanowski's Brigade approaching the Carlisle Road to come to the support of his exposed left flank. His right flank was covered only by the skirmish companies of the 17th Connecticut and some squadrons of Devin's cavalry posted between the Harrisburg Road and York Pike. Nevertheless, Barlow felt confident in the strength of his position and his ability to successfully defend it. It was nearly 3 P.m. 46

Early gave the nod to Gordon and his Georgians commenced their advance, their front covered by skirmishers. Doles edged his Georgians to their left until he joined Gordon's right. Nearly 2,800 Georgians were now moving to assault Blocher's Knoll. Early held Hays and Avery in place, wanting Gordon to become engaged before he committed these brigades upon the Federal flank. 47

Gordon's regiments were fatigued from the day's march and he allowed them to advance slowly until within 300 yards of Barlow's line. The enemy he directed his advance towards was von Gilsa's weak brigade. At 300 yards Gordon stepped up the pace. 48

Musketry crackled from the banks of Rock Creek as the 54th and 68th New York brought Gordon's advancing line under fire. The skirmishers of the 153rd Pennsylvania, in Blocher's Woods, could see no targets yet. Farther up the slope, Lieutenant Merkle's section of Bancroft's battery banged away at Doles's approaching brigade with shell and shrapnel. The remaining three guns of Bancroft's battery, which had shifted its position to the left of its initial firing position, also used shell and shrapnel on Doles's.49 As Gordon's Georgians neared Rock Creek they aggressively rushed upon von Gilsa's thin line on the opposite bank. The creek proved a formidable barrier. Gordon reported the "banks were so abrupt as to prevent passage excepting at certain points. . . ." Raising the Rebel yell, the Georgians splashed across the creek. Pvt. G. W. Nichols of the 61st Georgia, on Gordon's left, found the Federals particularly obstinate; "We advanced with our accustomed yell, but they stood firm until we got near them. They then began to retreat in fine order, shooting at us as they're treated. They were harder to drive than we had ever known them before."50

The 54th and 68th New York were unable to withstand the fury of Gordon's attack, which the Georgian believed was made "with a resolution and spirit, in my opinion, rarely excelled." The New Yorkers ran up the slope of Blocher's Knoll into the ranks of the supporting 153rd Pennsylvania. Pvt. Reuben Ruch of F Company recalled a man to his right raised his rifle-musket to shoot one of the retiring skirmishers when Cpl. Peter Smith knocked his rifle-musket into the air an instant before it discharged. Ruch and others then emptied their muskets into the Georgians who were now swarming across Rock Creek and scrambling up the hill. When Ruch reached for a second cartridge the man behind him was struck and fell in front of Ruch "his face towards me." An instant later the man to Ruch's left was killed. Ruch remained steady and sent four or five more rounds into Gordon's advancing host before he heard an order shouted to fall back.51

The situation was quickly deteriorating for the 153rd. Gordon's right broke the Pennsylvanians' left and the Georgians also worked around the regiment's right flank. Private Ruch hesitated to join his slowly retiring comrades. He spotted a color bearer splashing across Rock Creek "yelling like an Indian." Ruch determined to "fix him" the moment he capped his loaded piece. As he raised his weapon he changed his mind and determined he should shoot a man without a weapon. Spotting a Georgian reaching for the top rail of a post and rail fence several yards in front, Ruch aimed and squeezed the trigger. ". . . He struck his hand against his side and dropped. He did not come, over the fence." 52

The 153rd was now retiring, although stubbornly, firing as they made their way to the crest of the hill. Ruch recalled as he emerged from Blocher's Woods seeing the line of his regiment's dead: "They were piled in every shape, some on their backs, some on their faces, and others turned and twisted in every imaginable shape." The regiment was under a cross fire that dropped many a Pennsylvanian. Ruch was struck twice in the legs as he made his way up the knoll. Nearby, 19-year-old Pvt. John Trumbauer stepped up beside a large oak tree, leaned his rifle-musket against it and said, "Come boys, let us give them what they deserve." Before he could discharge his weapon he was struck through the right shoulder and dropped his weapon. "But he was made of good old stuff," and Trumbauer seized his weapon, worked the piece up to his left shoulder and fired into Gordon's ranks.53 In Company G, Capt. Howard Reeder deliberately discharged his revolver into the faces of the yelling Georgia until they were no more than 15 feet from him. He then turned and ran, miraculously

escaping without being hit. John Rush in K company was struck by a minie ball that passed nine inches through the muscles of his left arm shoulder. He turned to go and was hit by another that shattered his collar bone. Rush staggered on and encountered a young lieutenant who was trying to rally the men who were retiring. Rush explained he was wounded in both shoulders and the officer told him to break his weapon. When he replied this was impossible, the lieutenant had Rush pass him cartridges and caps while he fired the private's rifle-musket. Soon, Gordon's Confederates closed upon them and the lieutenant fled, narrowly escaping, while Rush fell into enemy hands.⁵⁴ On the summit of Blocher's Knoll, Lieutenant Bancroft had observed the collapse of von Gilsa's Brigade. Discharging his last rounds of canister, the lieutenant limbered guns and cleared out. Farther to the left, Merkle's section which had been firing canister into Doles's, left soon after. ⁵⁵

The collapse of von Gilsa's Brigade exposed the flank of Ames's Brigade, which was under attack from Doles's, Gordon promptly seized upon his advantage and pushed his right against Ames's right flank. The blow fell hard against the 25th Ohio and it began to waver. So, too, did the 107th Ohio, under heavy fire from Doles's. Ames ordered up the 75th Ohio and 17th Connecticut to restore the situation. Col. Andrew L. Harris, commanding the 75th, was instructed to fix bayonets and advance into the interval between the 107th and 25th Ohio. "It was a fearful advance and made at a dreadful cost of life," recalled Harris. Ames led the counterattack on foot but the front and flank fire brought it to a standstill. The 75th halted and attempted to return the fire that slashed their ranks.⁵⁶

The fire of the 75th, checked what was probably the 12th Georgia, but other elements of Doles's Brigade and Gordon's Brigade worked their way around the Ohioans' flanks. "Our situation was perilous in the extreme," wrote Harris. The 25th and 107th Ohio were being pressed back and the counterattack of the 17th Connecticut was thrown into disorder by men of von Gilsa's Brigade who came streaming to the rear and broke through their ranks. The New Englanders loosed only one volley then the regiment fell back "about ten feet or so." The regiment's colonel, Douglas Fowler, had his head blown off by a shell from Jones's Battalion, sending his brains spattering upon the regiment's adjutant, H. Whitney Chatfield. One company commander was also killed and two wounded. An officer shouted for the regiment to halt and momentarily the retreat stopped. But disorder and panic's seed had been sown and the regiment began to run again. William H. Warren of Company C saw Rufus Warren of his company throw up his hands and shout, "O Dear, Help me, Help me," before he fell It was not time for me to stop," wrote Warren, "so I kept on."⁵⁷

Francis Barlow exposed himself recklessly to stem the retreat of his men. As von Gilsa's men came streaming up the slope of the knoll he turned his horse to get in front of the men in order to rally them and "form another line in the rear." Before he could turn his horse a bullet struck him in the left side between the arm pit and head of the thigh bone. Barlow dismounted and tried to walk. "Every body was then running to the rear & the enemy were approaching rapidly," wrote the New Yorker several days later. Two men came up on either side of the wounded general and tried to assist him off the field. One of them was shot and fell and Barlow was struck by a spent ball in the back. Barlow's second attendant apparently departed for safer environs and the general lay down too faint to go on.⁵⁸

Back in Blocher's Woods, Colonel Harris considered his situation. He had lost more than fifty percent of his men and four of twelve officers. Ames, furiously attempting to rally the fast disintegrating division, failed to send Harris orders to retire. Harris decided he could hold no longer and escape being overrun. He ordered his men to disperse into a skirmish line to reduce losses and left Blocher's Woods to the Confederates. After a bruising, violent struggle of perhaps 15-20 minutes, Blocher's Knoll belonged to the Georgians of Doles's and Gordon's Brigades. The remnants of the 1st Division were streaming in retreat for the Almshouse. Assistance was fast approaching, however.⁵⁹ Schurz had dispatched Schimmelfennig's 2nd Brigade to Barlow's support the moment he had seen the advanced position the 1st Division had assumed. But, so swiftly had Gordon's and Doles's attack fallen, that Krzyzanowski was just leading his regiments across the Carlisle Road when the 1st Division began to disintegrate. The Pole's regiments advanced in column of divisions, probably to facilitate rapid movement and deployment, with the 82nd Ohio, 75th Pennsylvania, 119th New York, and 26th Wisconsin from left to right. The moving blue mass of nearly 1,200 men made a splendid target for Rodes's and Early's artillery as they moved over the open ground. Capt. Alfred Lee of E Company, 82nd Ohio, recalled that the Confederate artillery fire swept the plain from two or three directions "and their shells plunged through our solid squares, making terrible havoc." Heedless of their mounting losses, Krzyzanowski's regiments pressed on, tearing down fences that stood in their path.⁶⁰

As the brigade entered a meadow south of Blocher's wheatfield they observed the 21st Georgia, Doles's right regiment, in the wheat. Farther to the right, and probably still engaged with Ames's regiments were the 44th and 4th Georgia. "Their

movements were firm and steady, as usual," wrote Captain Lee, "and their banners, bearing the blue Southern cross, flaunted impudently and seemed to challenge combat." Krzyzanowski ordered his regiments to deploy and open fire. "Quick as a flash the compliment was returned," by Col. J. T. Mercer's 21st Georgia. Finding his regiment no match for the Federals' heavier numbers, Mercer pulled his men back to Blocher's farm lane and had his men lie down. 61

Doles reacted aggressively to Krzyzanowski's threat to his flank. The 44th and 4th Georgia shifted to face the Federals until the two lines were "scarcely more than seventy-five yards apart, and the names of battles printed on the Confederate flags might have been read had there been time to read them." For several minutes the two lines simply stood up and blazed away at one another. Doles's fire was rapid and accurate and the Federals dropped in scores along the firing line. Ames's regiments soon gave way on Krzyzanowski's right exposing the flank of the 26th Wisconsin to the fury of Gordon's musketry. Confederate musketry killed 26 of the Badger regiment and wounded 129. It gave way exposing the flank of the 119th New York. A front and enfilading fire ate away at the New Yorkers and they too began to drift to the rear. Krzyzanowski's left also crumbled as the 82nd Ohio was decimated by the fire of probably the 44th Georgia. As the 82nd started to fall back Captain Lee picked up a fallen musket to fire into the Georgians whose fire was tearing his regiment's ranks. As he went to load the weapon a young soldier dropped by his side crying out, "Oh, help me!" He seized Lee's hand and struggled to rise, but was unable. "Oh, I'm gone! just leave me here," he murmured. An instant later Lee "felt the sting of a bullet, and fell benumbed with pain. It was an instantaneous metamorphosis from strength and vigor to utter helplessness." He called to a nearby comrade for help, but he too was struck and struggled off leaving Lee to the eneMy. 62

Col. Francis Mahler's 75th Pennsylvania stood alone for a moment. Mahler had his horse shot down but jumped up and ran to his left flank which the 44th Georgia threatened to turn. Mahler went down with a mortal wound and Maj. August Ledig assumed command. Ledig ordered a left oblique fire and proceeded to pull his men back. In fifteen minutes of fighting the regiment had lost 108 men killed and wounded. Reduced to a shambles, Krzyzanowski's Brigade retreated across the Carlisle Road toward an orchard on the northern edge of town. 63

Unknown to Krzyzanowski's hard fighting regiments, Schimmelfennig had attempted to relieve the pressure upon them by sending the 157th New York forward to strike Doles's flank. With all the regiments of von Amsberg's Brigade either on the skirmish line or supporting Wheeler's and Dilger's batteries, Schimmelfennig could spare only the 409 officers and men of the 157th New York to counterattack Doles's exposed right flank. Col. Philip P. Brown was ordered forward, alone and unsupported, to face Doles's tough Georgians. 64

Brown led his regiment forward, then changed front to the right and advanced up nearly to the Carlisle Road, a mere fifty yards from the 44th Georgia. Maj. W. H. Peebles of the 44th saw Brown's New Yorkers approaching and having driven Krzyzanowski's regiments from his front by the time the 157th was in position, changed front to the right to confront the Federals. The 4th Georgia soon came into line on Peebles's left and the fire upon Brown's Federals intensified. Trouble soon loomed on Brown's left flank as the 21st Georgia rose from Blocher's lane and opened fire. Doles shifted the 12th Georgia from his extreme left to the right of the 21st Georgia and the brigade began a general advance. 65

Brown's New Yorkers fought back manfully, but they were now heavily outgunned. Lt. Col. George Arrowsmith went down, shot in the head, and the carnage in the ranks was terrific. The 44th and 4th Georgia pushed across the fences along the Carlisle Road and began to press around the 157th's right. On the left the 21st and 12th Georgia pressed forward. "The men were falling rapidly and the enemy's line was taking the form of a giant semi-circle ... concentrating the fire of their whole brigade upon my rapidly diminishing numbers," wrote Colonel Brown. One of Rodes's batteries, with an enfilading fire upon the 157th, added their shells to Doles's minie balls. Brown looked to the rear for support and saw an aide of Schimmelfennig's taking the saddle off his dead horse and sprinting for safety. Later Brown would learn the officer had stepped several paces beyond his fallen horse and "hallooted to me to retreat." Brown heard nothing and fought until his regiment ` was nearly annihilated, then ordered a retreat. No 11th Corps regiment would suffer as many casualties as the 157th on July 1. Brown lost 27 dead, 166 wounded, and 114 missing and captured, or 75 percent of his engaged strengths. 66

It was probably not yet 3:30 p.m. and the 11th Corps defense had been shredded by the brigades of Doles and Gordon. Although they had superior numbers available the 11th Corps had been outnumbered at the point of attack in every instance. It was a classic example of defeat in detail and an example of how a smaller force can defeat a larger one when

well handled. The remnants of the 1st Division attempted to rally about the Almshouse buildings. Colonel von Gilsa had lost his horse in the fighting on Blocher's Knoll, but he seized another that came by. Through sheer courage and leadership, von Gilsa managed to assemble a line of battle. "He rode up and down that line through a regular storm of lead, meantime using the German epithets so common to him," recalled Reuben Ruch. Adelbert Ames also struggled valiantly to stay the rout. Private Nichols of the 61st Georgia recalled the Federal officers at the Almshouse line "were cheering their men and behaving like heroes But Gordon's advancing line was still intact and his fire was heavy while Ames' regiments were in disorder which meant slack fire. The Almshouse line collapsed. "The whole division was failing back with little or no regularity, regimental organizations having become destroyed," reported Ames. Gordon swept through the Almshouse buildings scooping up dozens of prisoners who had become separated from their units and sought shelter among the many structures adjacent to the poor house.67

As Gordon's regiments cleared the Almshouse in their pursuit of Ames's routed division a fresh Federal line of battle appeared upon the northeastern edge of Gettysburg threatening the Georgian's left. Early, who was alertly keeping touch with the flow of the battle, saw the forming Federals and ordered Gordon to halt, then gave the signal to Hays and Avery to advance and crush this force. These two brigades had remained east of Rock Creek skirmishing with the four companies of the 17th Connecticut. Now they pushed across the creek, easily driving the New Englanders before them and bore down upon the fresh Federal battle line.68

The Federals were Col. Charles R. Coster's Brigade of the 2nd Division who, at last, had come to Schurz's aid. Schurz had sent a final courier to hurry this brigade on when he saw that Barlow was about to come under heavy attack. Capt. Fred Winkler, Schurz's AAG, carried the final urgent summons, galloping through town to Cemetery Hill, where he found Coster's men unmoved. "I urged haste impetuously," wrote Winkler, "and it set in motion at once." The brigade contained approximately 1,107 men, 200 men having been detached that morning to serve as flankers on the corps march to Gettysburg. The brigade double-quickened down Baltimore Street to Carlisle Street . 69 Preceding Coster by some minutes was Capt. Lewis Heckman's Company K, 1st Ohio Light (4 Napoleons), which had likely been ordered forward in response to Barlow's request for additional artillery support. Heckman rumbled through town and unlimbered on its northern edge, between the Carlisle and Harrisburg Roads. Targets in abundance were immediately offered him as Gordon's, Hays's, and Avery's regiments were probably in view. It was not an inviting position for an artilleryman. The Federal infantry was failing back in disorder rendering infantry support unlikely or unreliable. Nevertheless, Heckman unlimbered and ordered canister.70

As Heckman's guns thundered away and Barlow's and Schimmelfennig's Divisions fell back, Coster's fresh regiments came rushing down Carlisle Street. As they passed the railroad station, Coster dropped off the 73rd Pennsylvania ~ as a reserve, leaving him perhaps 800 effectives in his three remaining regiments. Capt. Winkler rode ahead of the brigade to seek out Schurz. He encountered men of the 1st Division "in a retreat less orderly than it should have been, crowding the sidewalks on both sides." The sight infuriated Winkler, "think of it; it was a northern village," he wrote. The Capt. encountered Schurz at the northern edge of town and pointed out Coster's approaching brigade. Schurz galloped up to Coster and personally led his column to Stratton Street, directing the colonel to deploy his three regiments east of the road to dispute the advance of Hays and Avery, who threatened to envelop the corps' right flank. One-half hour earlier Schurz had envisioned an offensive role for this brigade, now he hoped to use it to allow him to withdraw his two beaten divisions. 71

Coster led his men from Stratton Street across the front of a brickyard. His column caught the eye of some sharp eyed artillerymen of Rodes's artillery battalion and they sent several shells screaming towards the Federals. Each shell burst closer to the column as the gunners got the range. Sgt. John F. Wellman of B Company, 154th New York, wrote, "I looked for some disorder, but I swear to you today, not one man broke step from the head of the column to the rear. I said they were brave. I wanted to take off my hat and cheer them right then."

When the 27th Pennsylvania, Coster's last regiment, had cleared Stratton Street, he commanded, "halt, front, fight dress." Coster's right regiment, Lt. Col. Allan H. Jackson's, 134th New York deployed its 430 men in a wheatfield behind a stout post and rail fence. On the 134th's left, but with a gap between, formed Lt., Col. D. B. Allen's 154th New York, numbering approximately 220 men, also behind the rail fence. The left was held by Lt Col. Lorenz Cantador's 20th Pennsylvania, 283 strong The ground in front of the 27th sloped up to a ridge blocking their field of fire to the front so that the 27th could only fire at a right oblique. Coster might have advanced the 27th to the ridge but for the presence of the fence and

the fact that Hays's and Avery's regiments were within 200 yards by the time he had completed his deployment. The Federals were ordered to kneel and wait until the Confederates "were close enough to make our volley effective." 72

Heckman, off to Coster's left, turned his canister up Avery and Hays in an attempt to slow their advance. Although he may have slowed Hays, he did not check Avery, who moved upon Coster at the double-quick. "I shall always remember how the Confederate line of battle looked as it came into full view and started down towards us," wrote Sgt. Charles McKay of C Company, 154th New York; "It seemed as though they had a battleflag every few rods, which would indicate the formation was in solid column." The command rang out along Coster's line to commence firing. "Instantly the whole line is a blaze of fire," recorded Sgt. John Wellman of the 154th. In front of the 154th, the 21st North Carolina was checked and the 6th North Carolina suffered sharp casualties. Hays's Brigade came bearing down upon the brigade's left flank and the 57th North Carolina enveloped the right the 134th New York.73

Colonel Cantador had noticed the gap between the 134th and 154th New York shortly after the musketry battle had erupted. He shouted for his 2nd Battalion to double-quick behind the 154th and fill it in, but in the noise only 50 men under a stout 1st lieutenant named Adolphus F. Vogelbach responded and headed for the threatened sector. By the time they arrived the 134th New York had simply been shot to pieces. The 57th North Carolina had swung around almost into the New Yorkers' rear and tore their front, flank, and rear with musketry. Of the 430 men 42 were killed and 151 wounded. The position was hopeless and Coster ordered a retreat.74

Coster's order never reached Colonel Allen and the 154th New York, who battled manfully with the help of Lieutenant Vogelbach's contingent. Allan, who apparently was on the right of his regiment, saw the 134th go and ordered his regiment to retreat towards the left. When he reached the point in rear of where the 27th Pennsylvania had been he found they too had pulled out and Confederates of the 6th North Carolina and Hays' Brigade had passed beyond his left down Stratton Street and across an open field west of Allan's position. His situation was desperate. Casting a glance to the rear he saw the ground "cut up into village lots surrounded by board fences, so that retreat was greatly impeded in that direction." Allan led his regiment onto Stratton Street in an attempt to force his way through. A fierce hand-to-hand conflict ensued as the, opposing forces mingled with one another. Four color bearers, including two brothers, were shot down in rapid succession. Lieutenant Vogelbach, ignoring a summons surrender, attempted to fight his way through the North Carolinians and Louisianans, but was felled with a wound. His men, their courageous leader down, dropped their weapons and surrendered. Dozens in the 154th began to do the same. A mere 3 officers, including Colonel Allen, and 15 men, who survived the heavy fire directed at them, escaped. One officer, Lt. James W. Bird, managed to carry the state colors of the 154th and the third officer, Capt. M. B. Cheney, picked up both the state and national colors of the 134th New York and bore them from the field. Taken prisoner were 178 men of the 154th, 59 of the 134th New York, and 78 from the 27th Pennsylvania, mostly from Lieutenant Vogelbach's command. One member of the 154th, Lt. ? Jenkins, had just returned from being captured at Chancellorsville. He had entered the fight at Gettysburg vowing "I'll never surrender again." Cpl. Newell Burch noted, however, that Jenkins was among the prisoners who were disarmed and led to the rear.65

Disaster also befell Heckman's guns. Elements of the 6th North Carolina came upon him and the Ohioan ordered his guns to limber up and retire. The 6th North Carolina swarmed into his battery and captured two Napoleons. These might have been saved had some of Krzyzanowski's Brigade, which was nearby, chosen to fight. Major Winkler had come upon 100 to 150 men of the 2nd Brigade, who had been rallied, including 32 enlisted men of the 26th Wisconsin, Winkler's regiment. "It was use less, of course, to try to resist the long rebel forces that were then approaching, but we could delay them and thus ensure a safe retreat to the rest of our troops," he wrote. But, as Hays's line came nearer everyone but Winkler's small band departed without a fight. His men tried to join the rest, but Winkler halted them and had them crouch down. From his vantage point the captain watched Hays approach unopposed except for Heckman's guns and saw Avery overrun Coster. As Coster's men went, Winkler saw an aide of Krzyzanowski's. He shouted to him for orders and was told to retreat. Winkler's group fell back, fired a volley into what was probably Hays's right, and then fled into town with everyone else. Winkler burned with rage as he saw the Federal troops streaming into town in retreat. "It seemed so awful to march back through those same streets whipped and beaten," he wrote, "It was the most humiliating step I ever took." The captain stood in the Carlisle Road for a moment as if to beckon a bullet, but then joined in the retreat .76

The defeat of Coster's Brigade marked the end of organized resistance by the 11th Corps. It was no later than 3:45 p.m. and the five brigades of the corps that had deployed north of Gettysburg were in retreat through the streets of town. In less than one hour of fighting the corps had suffered heavy losses. A reasonable estimate would place them at 250 killed, 1,200

wounded, and 1,400 missing, most of whom were captured, or nearly 50 per cent of the force engaged. In return, the corps inflicted 765 casualties upon the four principal Southern brigades they had engaged. The many prisoners the 45th New York had captured from O'Neal's Brigade and sent back to Pennsylvania College, were freed later in the day by their comrades. In terms of losses taken and losses inflicted it had been a stunning defeat. What had happened? 77

Much of the corps' defeat can be explained by its position. There was simply too much ground for Schurz's four reduced brigades to adequately defend. Schurz had also to confront Rodes on Oak Hill and Early to the northeast, which meant facing in two different directions and exposing everyone to a cross and enfilading fire. Also, because the corps was so spread out to cover the ground the two divisions were unable to render timely support to one another allowing Doles and Gordon alone to beat three full brigades in detail and crush a regiment from a fourth brigade. Does Barlow deserve censure for pushing his line so far forward and losing connection with the 3rd Division? It would appear so but there is not sufficient evidence to form a reasonable opinion.

A second factor in the corps' defeat was Howard's delay in forwarding Coster's Brigade. If this brigade had been sent up when Schurz requested it, it might have slowed Early's attack and enabled the 1st and 3rd Divisions to get off the field without the excessive loss of prisoners they suffered.

Lastly, the corps had had the misfortune to encounter crack Confederate troops who were superbly and aggressively led. Gordon's and Doles's regiments were simply not to be denied. Early too had handled his division with consummate skill, feeding his brigades into the battle at precisely the right time and point.

Despite its defeat, the rank and file of the 11th Corps had fought with courage and frequently with tenacity. Many were the men and officers who distinguished themselves in the fight. Men such as Francis Irsch, who would later earn the Medal of Honor for his gallantry that day, Hubert Dilger, Bayard Wilkeson, Adelbert Ames, Reuben Ruch, and many others had shone brightly. But theirs had been a hopeless mission from the start, and even the stoutest courage could not have staved off the defeat that ultimately enveloped them.

Gettysburg Battlefield Monuments Dedicated to the 157th.



Monument Locations. Left (1): West Howard Avenue at Mummasburg Road, on the Gettysburg Plain. Center (2): Carlisle Road, north of Howard Avenue. Right (3): West Howard Avenue at Carlisle Road, on the Gettysburg Plain. **Monument #1 Inscriptions:** (Front) 157TH NEW YORK INFANTRY, 1ST BRIGADE, 3RD DIVISION, 11TH CORPS; 300 YARDS IN ADVANCE OF THIS POSITION WERE KILLED: 4 OFFICERS, 23 MEN 27; WOUNDED: 8 OFFICERS, 158 MEN 166; CAPTURED: 6 OFFICERS, 108 MEN 114; TOTAL CASUALTIES — 307, JULY 1, 1863. (Right) MUSTERED IN SEPTEMBER 19, 1862. MUSTERED OUT JULY 10, 1865. (Left) THE ADVANCE POSITION IS DESIGNATED BY A MARKER. (Monument #2)

The 11th Corps at Chancellorsville

From New York Tribune, May 1st - May 9th, 1863

From Our Special Correspondent - Chancellorsville, Virginia

Monday Morning, May, 1863

... It was now about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, and thus far all the movements undertaken had been successfully executed. Suddenly a most firm and heavy charge was made on the right flank and rear of Howard's Corps. Regiments, brigades and divisions broke and fled in the most terrible confusion. One brigade alone fought bravely until an attempt longer to hold the position would have been madness, then it stubbornly withdrew. To Colonel Buschbeck with his brigade comprising the 27th and 73rd Pennsylvania volunteers and the 29th and 154th New York is due the credit of having saved from capture the train and artillery of the corps.

The casualties among the men were slight. Thirteen pieces of artillery were left to the enemy; most of them by some unaccountable accident were spiked. The retreating train, the withdrawal of the artillery, and the jumbled and confused mass of stragglers and frightened soldiery that blocked the road and occupied the fields and woods, produced a degree of confusion that was truly alarming. Hooker's line was broken and deranged; the advanced position of Berry and Whipple's divisions and Barlow's brigade, made the situation more complicated. The enemy, flushed with a most brilliant success came rushing forward toward the rear of the right and center with yells and cheers that made the air hideous with ill omened sounds. The commanding general was, however, of all cool men, the coolest. Berry's division formed across the plank road, midway between Chancellorsville and Dowdall's cavern; his right well in the wood north of the road, and the artillery massed on a hill to his left; in the position he received and repulsed the attack of Stonewall Jackson, for he it was who led this desperate attack.

The giving way of the 11th Corps made it necessary that a new line be formed and old positions abandoned and new ones occupied. It was necessary to maintain intact the left wing and hold the line from the plank road to the river at Scott's Dam; it was equally a necessity to resist the seizure by the enemy of the United States Ford Road.

Signed: J. R. SYPHER

From Our Special Correspondent - Headquarters Army of the Potomac

Monday, May 4, 1863

The enemy, under Jackson, the two Hills, and Pickett continued advancing along the Fredericksburg Plank Road all day Saturday, cautiously feeling our lines as they passed. A part of the 12th Corps, General Geary's Division, and the 3rd Corps, General Sickles, moved toward them and attacked their flank with considerable success. The enemy continued his advance till opposite our extreme right held by the 11th Corps, General Howard. Upon this they made a vigorous attack. The 11th broke and ran in great confusion towards Chancellorsville, followed by the enemy, whose pursuit was at length checked by a line of battle formed across the road by Generals Berry of the 3rd and Williams of the 12th Corps. The night was spent by both enemy's in getting into position, with occasional heavy artillery and musketry skirmishes.

At daylight, Sunday morning, the battle commenced vigorously with Meade, Couch, and Sickles forming our center. General Reynolds with his 1st Corps who joined us over night occupying the right and the fugitive 11th the left in strong earthworks supported by the 12th Corps, General Slocum. At noon, after severe fighting we were obliged to fall back from Chancellorsville, and the order of battle was somewhat changed, along the different corps still retained their relative positions. Hostilities ceased pretty much with this, and the balance of the day was spent by our troops in strengthening their earthworks, with some pretty severe skirmishing along our outposts. This morning a brisk artillery fire commenced at daybreak, the two armies being in close quarters. We are looking for the arrival of Sedgewick of the 6th Corps, whose guns can be heard in camp. We have captured 6,000 prisoners, some who have reported the death of General A.P. Hill. Our losses are heavy.

Signed: N. G. SHEPHERD

From Our Special Correspondent - Headquarters Army of the Potomac

Wednesday, May 6, 1863 - 10:45 a.m.

The 11th Corps, which unfortunately broke and ran from the field on Saturday night, burned an opportunity to wipe away the imputation of cowardice, under which they rested. They alleged that they had been led to believe by information brought from the headquarters of the army, that the enemy was making a southerly direction and that he was therefore rather endeavoring to escape than to fight. They said that their cavalry having been taken away from them, they were unable to learn the true position of the enemy in their front; that he came up suddenly from an unexpected direction, their first knowledge of his approach being the driving in their skirmishers, and the capture of their pickets. But 10 minutes had elapsed from the first alarm, before Von Gilsa's brigade, which was in position on the road along which the enemy advanced, retired in great confusion, his artillery running lengthwise through General Schurz entire division, breaking his lines and throwing his command into such disorder that it also fled in confusion. On the left of the 11th Corps, General Devens fled after making but slight resistance.

... The 11th Corps, burning with anxiety for an opportunity to retrieve their honor was also in reserve, avoiding the approach of the river by way of Scotts Dam.

... When the 11th Corps became disorganized on Saturday, a private in the 26th Wisconsin was detached from the regiment and continued to dodge the enemy, and traveled through the woods until he arrived at Fredericksburg where he joined Sedgwick's command. He borrowed a musket and aided in the capture of the place. When the enemy fell back the solitary soldier moved forward along the river road, through mostly in the woods, and rejoined his command near Scotts Dam, on Monday evening. He saw no enemy save when in battle, and was neither at Fredericksburg nor Chancellorsville challenged by the national pickets.

Signed: J. R. SYPHERS

From Our Special Correspondent

LEFT WING, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC

May 5, 1863

... Our greatest loss (in prisoners) was in the 11th army corps, Howard's - late Sigel's - which is said not to have behaved well.



From The Washington Chronicle,

May 8, 1863

The Condition of the Army of the Potomac - With the exception of the time of the panic in the 11th Corps, the men stood as firm as rocks, and literally mowed the rebels down as fast as they came up.

New York, New York

Madison County

Population			
1810	25,144	1820	32,208
1830	39,038	1840	40,008
1850	43,072	1855	43,788
1860	43,545	1865	42,607
1870	43,522	1875	42,342
1900	40,545	1910	39,289
1920	39,535	1930	39,790
1940	39,598	1950	46,214
1960	54,635	1970	62,864
1980	65,150	1990	69,340
1997	71,652	2000	69,441

New York State Map



The Towns and Villages of Madison County, c1860

From the *Gazetteer of the State of New York*
by J.H. French.

The fourteen townships in Madison County are listed below, and the villages in each township are also listed.

Brookfield

Clarkville
Leonardsville
North Brookfield
South Brookfield
DeLancey

Cazenovia

Cazenovia
New Woodstock
Chittenango Falls

DeRuyter

DeRuyter
Sheds Corners

Eaton

Morrisville
Eaton
West Eaton
Pratts Hollow
Pine Woods

Fenner

Perryville
Fenner

Georgetown

Georgetown

Hamilton

Hamilton
Earlville
Poolville
Hubbardsville
East Hamilton
West Hamilton

Lebanon

Lebanon
Smiths Valley
Middleport

Lenox

Canastota
Wampsville
Pine Bush
Merrillsville
Lenox Furnace
Clockville
Quality Hill
Oneida Lake
South Bay
Oneida Valley
Durhamville

Madison

Madison
Bouckville
Solsville

Nelson

Erieville
Nelson Flats

Smithfield

Peterboro
Siloam

Stockbridge

Munnsville
Knoxville
Cooks Corners

Sullivan

Chittenango
Perryville
Canaseraga
Bridgeport
Lakeport

Town of Madison Early Industries

Peet Bros.	Cider; Cheese Boxes; Sawmill	1862-early 20th century - H.I. & E.I. Peet's mill employed 20 persons during cider time; in 1879 produced a record 10,000 barrels of cider. In sawmilling & cheese box manufacturing, 6-10 men were employed. Leo Phelps ran the mill & 2 box factories in 1899. (Bouckville)
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Madison – A Brief Description

The town of Madison lies on the east border of the County, south of the center. It is bounded north by Stockbridge and Augusta, east by Sangerfield and Brookfield, south by Hamilton, and west by Eaton. Its principal stream is the Oriskany Creek, the source of one of its branches, and one of those of the Chenango, being in this town. Madison Brook Reservoir, one of the feeders of the Chenango Canal, is situated near the south part of the town; it covers an area of 235 acres, is 45 feet deep, and has a feeder two miles long. The Chenango Canal passes through the town northwest of the center, bearing in a northeasterly and southwesterly direction. Nearly the entire length of the summit level of this Canal is in the town of Madison. The Utica, Clinton & Binghamton Railroad, crosses the same section of the town, and is all the way contiguous to the Canal. The soil of the town is a gravelly loam in the valleys, and clayey loam upon the hills; the deepest and most extensive deposits of gravel-drift in the county are found in the eastern part of this town, being near Madison village, one hundred feet deep. The general surface of the township is diversified between undulating valley and rolling upland. Marl deposits are found in some places. Says Guerdon Evans: (Trans. Ag. Soc., p. 762.)

"The small pond (Little Lake,) in Madison, has filled up with marl deposits on one side as much as twenty rods within fifty years; and the beach on the side where the filling up has taken place is composed entirely of white marl and shells; so it is said by the inhabitants who have resided here for more than fifty years. The reason why the accumulation has occurred, appears to be that the pond is sheltered on all sides by a gravel bank about 80 feet high, so that as the shells rise to the surface they are always floated to the side of the outlet, instead of being driven to all sides, as is often the case where the surface is exposed to winds from various directions. At the rate that this pond has filled up for the last fifty years, it will, in the course of two hundred years be quite obliterated, provided the same cause continues to operate."

From the prominent heights of the Stockbridge and Eaton range of hills, overlooking the point where the Oriskany and Chenango valleys diverge, where the little lakes abound, whose outlets are only kept from taking one course by the almost imperceptible rise of the summit level, is a most beautiful view of the lengthened basin, formed by the oppositely extending valleys. From the Eaton heights, particularly, the undulating country bordering the Oriskany is revealed in its most perfect contour; it appears to the observer to be a broad valley, lying visible to the eye far toward the Mohawk, with the range of hills on either side sloping towards each other; but as we follow the course of the Oriskany, what had seemed a valley is but a lengthy undulating plateau, rising and extending back southward from the course of the creek, forming a goodly portion of the fair territory of the town.

The ancient race of the Oneida Nation, held all this territory in the ages past; the lofty heights of their famous "Council Ground" held a commanding view of the prospect of valley and hillside, and woodland broken here and there by shiny lakes. Centuries ago, many a path down the Stockbridge hillsides came winding around and among those nestling lakes, where the red men fished in summer for ages. An ancient map shows a path following the Oriskany a distance, then diverging in the direction of Fort Herkimer, (east of Utica,) which was traversed occasionally in the early part of the eighteenth century by adventurous white men, and which had been for many years a frequented path of the "Six Nations."

Near Madison Lake lay an opening in the heavy forest, where, years before white men saw it, luxurious Indian corn thrived in the full sunshine, cultivated by the dusky Oneidas; here the native women gathered it, in the contiguous waters the men fished, the half nude children meanwhile rolling upon the beach or playing under the shade of the luxurious oaks. But in time, having yielded their right to this territory, the Indian saw this with other cherished localities pass into other hands; the handsome location, the charming scenery, attracted the pioneers, and naturally enough the "Indian Opening," as it was called, became the first location for a concentrated settlement.

Madison was originally No. 3, of the "Chenango Twenty Townships," and was also included in the town of Paris, until March 5th, 1795, when Hamilton was organized; thereafter for twelve years it was embraced in the town of Hamilton. February 6th, 1809, Madison was formed from Hamilton; it was named in honor of President Madison. It embraced an area of 22,500 acres. The first town officers elected, were: --- Erastus Cleaveland, Supervisor; Jonathan Pratt, Israel Rice, Ephraim Blodgett, Assessors; Silas Patrick, Constable and Collector; Joseph Curtis, Pound Keeper. At this first meeting it

was voted that the next town meeting be held in the Center Meeting House. It was accordingly held there in 1808, and the following town officers were chosen for that year: --- Erastus Cleaveland, Supervisor; Jonathan Pratt, Seth Blair, John White, Assessors; Isaac Thompson, Seth Snow, Amos Burton, Commissioners of Highways; Russell Barker, Esq., and John T. Burton, Overseers of the Poor; Daniel Barber, Constable and Collector. It was voted at this meeting that widows be exempt from highway taxes.

Chenango Canal 1837-1878

The Chenango Canal has done much for the prosperity of the town of Madison, as well as for the county at large, and other sections through which it passes. In its incipiency the prominent men of Madison, Chenango and Broome Counties, particularly, labored long and earnestly to obtain a movement by the Legislature in its behalf. Moses Maynard was sent: by the people to Albany to advocate the budding enterprise. By his persistent efforts he obtained recognition of the bill, and also gained the interest of Wm. C. Bouck, who afterwards became Governor. The Governor's influence was a great acquisition; the bill received attention, Commissioners were appointed to estimate the cost, &c.; but even this support, together with Mr. Maynard's two years' labor at Albany, did not quite insure the success of the enterprise, till it was ascertained that the "long level" on the Erie Canal needed another feeder. The advocates of the new canal were on hand at this juncture; they succeeded in showing conclusively that the proposed work would become such a feeder, and the bill authorizing its construction, therefore, passed; with provisions that it take none of the waters from the Oriskany and Sauquoit Creeks, and that the cost be not more than a million dollars. The work was begun in 1833, and completed in 1836. The summit level, as before stated, is in this town. From Oriskany Falls to Bouckville, a distance of six miles, it rises 172 feet, it being at the latter point 1,128 feet above tide. From Utica to the summit, it rises 706 feet, by 76 locks, and from thence descends 303 feet by 38 locks, to the Susquehanna, at Binghamton.

The origin of the name of "Water Street" is thus related: - One hot summer day, when the country was new, a stranger on horse-back came through the town on this street, and at every house stopped for water to give his thirsty horse; there were no wells, and the springs and streams were dry. Being at last unable to refresh himself or beast, he rode off in disgust to the nearest point on the Oriskany Creek, where their pressing needs were satisfied. He mentioned his ill luck on that long street to the first settlers he met, and contemptuously called it "Water St." It has borne that name to this day.

We have before noted that the first crop of hops grown in Madison County (perhaps in Central New York,) was raised by James D. Cooledge. In 1808, he began the culture by securing all the roots that could be spared from the single hill or two in each of his neighbors' gardens; these he increased and enlarged from, year after year, and supplied home breweries. In the fall of 1816, Mr. Cooledge took the first western hops to the New York market, after which, dealers in that product were ready to hold out inducements to growers in Central New York. His adjoining neighbor, Solomon Root, also engaged in hop growing as soon as he could obtain the setts, and about the year 1817 or '18, sold two tons of hops at \$1,000 per ton. After this, farmers of this section needed no urging to go into the business. During the subsequent forty years the town of Madison was largely indebted to the hop culture for its steadily growing wealth; so marked and substantial was the advance among hope growers that travelers were always struck with the evidences of it on every farm where one or more acres of stacked poles were to be seen.

Schools



Howes Hill School in 2002

This was one of the "common" schools located throughout the County. In the hills south east of the Center were other common schools such as Howe's Hill [on Stone Road], Durfee [on Quarterline Road], "Red School House"[on the corner of Rte. 20 and Center Road], and another on Tinker Hollow Road. Howe's Hill school is the only one of those still standing after nearly 150 years. It stands in contrast below the new high tech windmills of the newly constructed "wind farm". But it won't last much longer unless the people of Madison, with the permission of the present owners, decide to preserve it. The Center school was used, I believe, after Durfee, and Howe's Hill were closed. The Center school was remodeled and is now a residence.

New York State, the First Center of Hop Growing

Benjamin Franklin once said: "Beer is proof that God loves us and wants us to be happy." Colgate's drink of choice has been making us happy for some 5,000 years - about as long as bread has been around to soak up its effects. Occupying a small niche in recent beer history is our very own Madison County.

In 1808, two years after the founding of Madison County, James D. Coolidge planted the first hopyard in New York State near the Village of Madison. Eight years later, Coolidge traveled to New York City and sold the first Madison County hop crop earning \$2,000 for two tons.

The burgeoning industry took off in 1822 when an English hop shortage pushed prices up making it more cost efficient to brew beer using American hops. With the construction of the Erie Canal in 1825, a market to the west opened up. In an 1872 history of Madison County, Luna M. Hammond noted, "During the subsequent 40 years, the town of Madison was largely indebted to the hop culture for its steadily growing wealth; so marked and substantial was the advance among hop growers, that travelers were always struck with evidences of it on every farm where one or more acres of stacked poles were to be seen."

By 1849, New York State created about 70 percent of the entire national hop output; by 1859 it produced about 88 percent. Throughout the nineteenth century, the counties of Otsego, Madison, Oneida, Schoharie, Franklin, Montgomery and Ontario were the most important areas for hop production in the U.S. Some innovative credit is due to Madison County farmers for their inventions of standard hop poles and a hop picking machine combining the process of picking and separating hops into one easy step.

Each harvest season from late August to mid-September brought itinerant workers to the area, and all children and able hands could be found out in the fields picking hops. In *Lebanon Hill Tales and Anecdotes*, brothers Harry and Aaron Hart set down their memories of the area where their family had been farming since 1820. To them "it seemed like it was time to write about the local happenings and places before they became too faded in memory." In one tale they describe the harvest season.

"The 'thrashin' (not threshing) as it was always called, locally, was done in the late fall. The grain was either put in the barn or stacked. The cleaner, or separator as the threshing machine was called, was most often set up on the barn floor, and a steam engine belted to it. Later, of course, the gasoline engine was used. There would be ten or twelve men to work, neighbors and hired men to do a job. The 'cleaner' had to be fed by hand by the 'feeder' standing on the machine. Each bundle had to be placed head first and the band cut and then shoved into the throat of the cleaner. The bundles had to be spaced just right so there was an even flow of straw to the 'cleaner.' Wherever you worked you would soon become a colorful character in a short time; everyone getting black enough from the dust for a minstrel show."

Once brewers were convinced of the hop's value, however, they had to learn to live with its whimsical nature. The hop seemed peculiarly defenseless against the attacks of natural enemies, and almost every adversity could prove fatal. As Mathias writes:

"A whole series of misfortunes was always possible, developing with an almost tropical luxuriance: the little black 'bob' insect and lice on young plants in the spring, the long-winged fly at midsummer, aphids, grubs and more summer lice which only heavy rain could wash away; 'fire-blast' (intense heat following damp which withered and parched the leaves) and the 'mould,' 'fen' or blight -- the greatest killer of them all."

Thoroughly capricious, these killers might devastate one crop and leave one on the other side of a tilled field in the full bloom of health. All this served to create huge swings between good and bad harvests, which in turn sent the price of hops falling or soaring. Perversely, the uncertainty created speculation and a booming industry.

Hop growers unashamedly waited for the dream season when misfortune would destroy their fellows' crops and send prices for their own healthy hops up through the clouds. Conversely, growers dreaded a boom season, when they would have to pay the maximum labor costs to harvest the crop, which was then practically worthless because of its abundance.

Not surprisingly, it was the brewers with deeper pockets and larger storehouses who were able to weather shortages and high prices, and take advantage of low prices. If consecutive bad seasons created dire shortages, the brewers would be forced to lower the hopping rate. If they still sold every drop they brewed, they were encouraged to leave the hopping rate lower to save money. And so beer became less bitter over the years.